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ogy.' 9 Nevertheless, by affording this greater protection to employ-
ees on statutory grounds, the Board is perhaps indicating that it
intends to take a more expansive view of its responsibility to protect
the process of employee self-organization and collective bargain-
ing. 0 The Board may accomplish this result by developing the sepa-
ration of "mutual aid or protection" from union organization and
collective bargaining which it has begun in Weingarten.
Thomas A. Berret
CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964-TITLE VII-AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN
HIRING-PERSONS PROTECTED-The United States District Court for
the District of New Jersey has held that a white male is not a
member of any class protected by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 and may not invoke the protection of the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission's guidelines which require that any stand-
ardized test which serves as a basis for hiring by an employer must
be job-related.
Mele v. United States Department of Justice, 395 F. Supp. 592
(D.N.J. 1975).
The International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (IBEW),
Local 52, administered an affirmative action program' formulated
79. In Lafayette Radio Electronics Corp., 194 N.L.R.B. 491 (1971), the trial examiner
found the general counsel's argument that employees were entitled to representation was
based on the principles underlying the United States Supreme Court decision in Escobedo
v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964). He rejected this argument on the grounds that Escobedo
turned on a constitutional guarantee of the right to counsel, while the right sought by the
employees was a contract right. 194 N.L.R.B. at 494.
80. Cf. the Board's statement in Weingarten that
[it] could not and did not immediately articulate all the rights and duties inherent
in Section 7. In its early years the Board was mainly concerned with more obvious
violations of the Act, as many employers resisted the basic concepts of self-
organization and collective bargaining. With the passage of time, acceptance of self-
organization and collective bargaining has increased, and the Board has had to deal
with new, and often more subtle practices which are nonetheless inimical to the pur-
poses and policies of the Act.
Supplemental Brief for Petitioner at 5-6.
1. Affirmative action plans assure positive steps will be taken to achieve equal employ-
ment opportunity for minority groups. The concept involves more than simply refraining from
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pursuant to a prior consent decree and designed to correct past
discriminatory practices in the union's admissions policy. In accord-
ance with the plan and under the supervision of the New Jersey
Department of Labor, the union scheduled an open examination as
part of its trainee recruitment program. John Mele, a Caucasian
male, was denied entrance into the apprenticeship program after he
took the examination and was informed he had failed. Upon
learning that dual scoring had been used in the selection,3 Mele filed
a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC).' The EEOC investigated but refused to act upon the com-
plaint, whereupon Mele filed an action with the United States Dis-
trict Court for the District of New Jersey.5 He alleged that the
IBEW, as an employer,' had discriminated against him solely on the
further discriminatory acts; it requires that employers go beyond passive nondiscrimination
and take specific steps toward the elimination of employment barriers to minorities. Such
steps include, but are not limited to, adequate advertising of employment opportunities and
active recruitment of minority applicants. For a detailed discussion of the affirmative action
concept as it applies to the construction industry see Contractors Ass'n v. Secretary of Labor,
442 F.2d 159 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 854 (1971). See generally Developments in the
Law-Employment Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 HARv. L.
REV. 1109, 1291-1304 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Developments].
2. In United States v. Journeymen Local 24, 364 F. Supp. 808 (D.N.J. 1973), the United
States filed a complaint against IBEW Local 52 and others for unlawful discriminatory
practices which were evidenced in part by the fact that only eight of the Local's six hundred
members were black. Id. at 812. The parties entered into a consent decree whereby the IBEW
agreed that at least twenty-five members of its next group of trainees would be black or
Spanish-surnamed. In addition, the IBEW agreed that any standardized test which would
serve as the basis for an employment decision would be validated in accordance with the
guidelines promulgated by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. See text ac-
companying notes 15-21 infra.
3. As the court interpreted the consent decree, thirty of the next thirty-five apprentices
would be members of minority groups. The union graded the minority group's examinations
separately and offered positions to the thirty minority applicants with the highest scores. The
five highest ranking nonminority candidates completed the trainee group. Mele v. United
States Dep't of Justice, 395 F. Supp. 592, 594 (D.N.J. 1975). The consent decree did not
mandate a dual scoring system; nor do the EEOC guidelines suggest such a method is
appropriate. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 1607.1-.14 (1975). The court never addressed the propriety of
this system.
4. In 1972, the EEOC was given the power to initiate civil suits as one means of fulfilling
its obligation to detect and eliminate employment discrimination under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e to
2000e-17 (1974), amending Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-15 (1970)
[hereinafter referred to as Title VII or the Act]. The EEOC may sue any employer, labor
union or employment agency which has not voluntarily complied with its directives. Id. §
2000e-5(f)(1).
5. Mele v. United States Dep't of Justice, 395 F. Supp. 592 (D.N.J. 1975).
6. The opinion refers to the IBEW as an employer rather than a labor union. The distinc-
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basis of his race in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
19641 and Executive Order No. 11246.8 He alleged that the discrimi-
nation resulted from the use of a preferential hiring quota' and the
use of a non-validated test.'0
The first issue the court addressed was whether court-ordered
preferential hiring structured on racial considerations violated Title
VII." The court disposed of the issue broadly, rather than in terms
of the specific consent decree involved.'" Since affirmative action
tion is not critical, however, since Title VII also prohibits unions from engaging in discrimina-
tory practices. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c) (1970).
7. Title VII states in part: "It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer
to fail or refuse to hire. . . any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual
. ..because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex or national origin. ... Id. §
2000e-2(a)(1).
8. The Executive Order reads in part: "The contractor will not discriminate against any
employee or applicant for employment because of race, color, religion, sex or national origin."
3 C.F.R. 169, 170 (1974), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1970). Executive Orders are generally viewed as
having the force and effect of law. See Joyce v. McCrane, 320 F. Supp. 1284, 1290 (D.N.J.
1970).
Executive Order No. 11246 contains a mandate that contractors take affirmative action
guaranteeing employees are hired and treated during employment without regard to race,
color, religion, sex or national origin. 3 C.F.R. 169, 170-71 (1974), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1970).
The Order authorizes the federal government to require that bidders on government contracts
formulate and submit affirmative action programs. Id. Each plan must outline specific goals
and timetables for the prompt achievement of full and equal employment opportunity. The
penalty for noncompliance can be severe. See, e.g., Rosetti Contracting Co. v. Brennan, 508
F.2d 1039 (7th Cir. 1975) (bidder disqualified with no opportunity for amendment once the
bids were opened).
9. In addition to Title VII's basic proscriptive language, the Act contains an antipreferen-
tial provision. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (1970). The pertinent language appears at note 68 infra.
This section has been interpreted as a ban on preferential hiring. Pennsylvania v. Glickman,
370 F. Supp. 724 (W.D. Pa. 1974) (§703(j) prohibits any hiring on the basis of race). See note
61 infra.
10. An employer's use of a standardized test for hiring and promotions is not in itself
discriminatory. When a test excludes a disproportionate number of minorities from job con-
sideration, however, the employer must demonstrate that the test bears a reasonable relation-
ship to job performance. 29 C.F.R. §§ 1607.3-.9 (1975). The employer must show a definite
need for the test and must demonstrate that the test accurately identifies criteria indicative
of successful job performance. Id. While various courts have interpreted job-relatedness dif-
ferently, the Supreme Court has defined the concept in terms of "business necessity." Griggs
v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971). Validation, simply stated, is the process of
satisfying the business necessity test. See 2 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTs 2d Racial Discrimination
in Employment-Testing and Educational Requirements 237 (1974).
11. 395 F. Supp. at 595. The concept of quotas in hiring derives from two sources. Execu-
tive Order No. 11246 mandates such plans. See note 8 supra. Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act authorizes federal courts to order whatever relief they deem appropriate after finding past
and present discriminatory hiring practices. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1970), as amended, 42
U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(g) (1972).
12. The plaintiff not only assailed quotas in general; he attempted to distinguish the
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plans establishing numerical quotas to remedy the effects of past
discrimination have consistently been upheld, 3 the court concluded
that the consent decree in question was in conformity with existing
law and a valid exercise of the court's equitable powers. 4
The court next addressed the "more troublesome" issue of test
validation'5 and its viability in a situation where a white plaintiff
challenged an unvalidated test under Title VII. The court read the
guidelines promulgated by the EEOC 1 as equating the use of any
consent decree in question by arguing that courts have implemented quotas only where other
remedies have proved ineffective or a compelling need exists to integrate a particular em-
ployee group due to a high degree of public visibility. Brief for Appellant at 11-12, Mele v.
United States Dep't of Justice, 395 F. Supp. 592 (D.N.J. 1975). Mete never addressed this
argument. See Bridgeport Guardians, Inc. v. Bridgeport Civil Serv. Comm'n, 482 F.2d 1333
(2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 991 (1975) (importance of black patrolmen); United
States v. Wood Lathers Local 46, 471 F.2d 408 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 939 (1973)
(failure to abide by initial decree).
13. Among the cases the Mete court cited were Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950 (1972) (fire department to include twenty minority members
among its next sixty hires); Contractors Ass'n v. Secretary of Labor, 442 F.2d 159 (3d Cir.
1971) (upholding the "Philadelphia Plan," which required minority goals in the construction
trades ranging from nineteen to twenty-six percent). See 395 F. Supp. at 595.
Courts have demonstrated much flexibility in this area and there is substantial authority
for the propriety of numerical preferences in employment. See, e.g., United States v. Masonry
Contractors Ass'n, 497 F.2d 871, 877-78 (6th Cir. 1974) (reserve at least five percent of all
bricklayer hours for blacks); Arnold v. Ballard, 390 F. Supp. 723, 736 (N.D. Ohio 1975) (as
openings occur in city police department, it "seems a reasonable approach" that one of every
three hired be black); Crockett v. Green, 388 F. Supp. 912, 922 (E.D. Wis. 1975) (one-to-one
ratio until number of blacks in skilled crafts equals the percentage of blacks in Milwaukee).
Cf. Rogers v. International Paper Co., 510 F.2d 1340, 1355 (8th Cir. 1975) (to insure their
"rightful place" in plant hierarchy, minorities may forego residency requirements for certain
jobs absent a showing of business necessity); Harper v. Kloster, 486 F.2d 1134, 1135 (4th Cir.
1973) (denying permanent preferential relief but ordering fire department to accept appli-
cants from the Baltimore area only (population 47% black) rather than from the entire urban
area, where the population was 24% black). Contra, Hiatt v. City of Berkeley, 10 FEP Cases
251 (Cal. Super. 1975) (proposed affirmative action plan violated the Civil Rights Act of
1964).
14. See Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145, 154 (1965) (courts have "not merely the
power but the duty" to render decrees which will eliminate the vestiges of past discrimination
and prevent discrimination in the future).
15. 395 F. Supp. at 595. See note 10 supra.
16. Guidelines on Employment Selection Procedures, 29 C.F.R. §§ 1607.1-.14 (1975). Title
VII explicitly permits employers to hire and promote by the use of standardized tests under
certain conditions. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1970). Guidelines were formulated to curb poten-
tial abuse, since a test neutral on its face could exclude a disproportionate number of blacks
whose educational level was typically lower than that of whites. Moreover, the tests could be
subtly slanted in a white applicant's favor. This phenomenon was acknowledged by Justice
Douglas in DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 320 (1974) (dissenting opinion), where a white
student alleged he had been denied admission to law school because of the preferential
treatment afforded minority applicants. Justice Douglas realized that law school admission
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unvalidated standardized test'7 with discrimination per se.'8 Noting
that lower federal courts have split on the question of whether an
unvalidated test constitutes discrimination per se,'" the Mele court
was satisfied that the Supreme Court had settled the issue in Griggs
v. Duke Power Co.,'" which placed the burden on the employer to
demonstrate that any test with a significant discriminatory effect
was job-related. Since a validity study has been the only acceptable
method of demonstrating job-relatedness, the court reasoned that
Griggs had adopted the per se approach to non-validation: an unval-
idated test would not meet the employer's burden, and use of the
test would violate Title VII.1'
tests, while neutral on their face, could have a discriminatory effect due to differences in the
cultural backgrounds of minorities and the dominant Caucasian group. Id. at 334. A test
"sensitively tuned" to the majority of applicants would indirectly discriminate against minor-
ities; if that were the case he would approve giving them preference by considering their
applications separately. Validation under the guidelines attempts to decrease the probability
that a test will be discriminatory.
17. The guidelines set out in great detail what employers must do to establish that a test
is sufficiently job-related. 29 C.F.R. §§ 1607.4-.9 (1975). Similar guidelines were issued by
the Secretary of Labor for use by federal contractors in determining whether tests they have
implemented conform with the requirements of Executive Order No. 11246. 41 C.F.R. §§ 60-
3 to -3.18 (1975). For a detailed discussion of the judicial approach to the complexities of test
validation see Kirkland v. New York State Dep't of Correctional Servs., 374 F. Supp. 1361,
1370-74 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), rev'd in part and remanded, 520 F.2d 420 (2d Cir. 1975).
18. 395 F. Supp. at 596.
19. Compare Hicks v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 319 F. Supp. 314 (E.D. La. 1970),
modified, 321 F. Supp. 1241 (E.D. La. 1971) (since employer engaged in no significant study
to support its testing program, the program was unlawful) with United States v. H.K. Porter
Co., 296 F. Supp. 40, 76-77 (N.D. Ala. 1968) (requiring evidence that the use of an unvalidated
test has resulted in discrimination).
20. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). Griggs is the Supreme Court's only major declaration to date
concerning permissible employment criteria under Title VII. The Court has recently
reaffirmed its holding in Griggs as it pertains to test validation. Albermarle Paper Co. v.
Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
21. Tests which have a discriminatory effect against minorities are subject to close judi-
cial scrutiny; often they do not survive. See, e.g., Douglas v. Hampton, 512 F.2d 976 (D.C.
Cir. 1975) (blacks improperly denied injunction when statistics showed that the Federal
Service Entrance Examination had a disproportionate adverse impact on blacks and lacked
empirical validation); Rogers v. International Paper Co., 510 F.2d 1340, 1350 (8th Cir. 1975)
(failure to include blacks in validation studies and absence of "differential" validation ren-
dered studies inadequate); Boston Chapter, NAACP, Inc. v. Beecher, 504 F.2d 1017 (1st Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 910 (1975) (validation study of two-part test conducted by
defendant's expert was inadequate); Crockett v. Green, 388 F. Supp. 912 (E.D. Wis. 1975)
(validation study must evince a business necessity, not merely a business purpose). But see
Tyler v. Vickery, 517 F.2d 1089 (5th Cir. 1975) (although Georgia bar examination excludes
disproportionate number of blacks, test need not be validated when state has a substantial
interest in ensuring standards of minimum legal competence).
Duquesne Law Review
Despite the fact that the test Mele took had not been validated
in accordance with the guidelines,22 the court held he was not enti-
tled to relief. Since the guidelines applied only to tests which ad-
versely affected the employment opportunities of "classes protected
by Title VII, ' '23 a test which adversely affected white applicants was
not discriminatory under the statute. The court reasoned Congress
did not intend that Title VII should extend the Act's protections to
whites, who were the dominant majority; thus Mele could not in-
voke the protection of the EEOC guidelines, which reflected the
purposes of Title VII in the area of employment testing.24 Allega-
tions that discriminatory tests adversely affected nonminority ap-
plicants failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. 25
An analysis of the Mele rationale must consider that the IBEW's
affirmative action plan had been implemented pursuant to a court
order.26 Absent such a decree, the union's racially structured prefer-
ential policy might be constitutionally questionable;27 since the
union's hiring policy had been ordered by the court, it was less
susceptible to attack.28 Had the court explicitly based its decision
in Mele on the prior decree, the case would have been clear and
consistent with the court's past policy. Rather than summarily re-
ferring the plaintiff to the earlier court order, however, the court
apparently limited the ambit of Title VII by confining the concept
of test validation to a class consisting only of minorities who faced
22. Although the consent decree required it, the test Mele took had not been validated.
Brief for Appellant at 22.
23. This limitation appears twice in the guidelines. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.3 (1975) (defining
discrimination); Id. § 1607.14 (relating test validation to affirmative action). Presumably the
language refers to Title vII's enumerated classifications of race, color, religion, sex and
national origin. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1970).
24. Title VII has been invoked to protect minorities from employment decisions based
upon criteria such as the applicant's past garnishment and arrest records. If such practices
are shown to have a significant discriminatory effect, the employer must evince a sufficient
correlation between an employee's past history and substandard job performance. See Wal-
lace v. Debron, 494 F.2d 674 (8th Cir. 1974) (garnishment); Gregory v. Litton Systems, Inc.,
316 F. Supp. 401 (C.D. Cal. 1970), modified, 472 F.2d 631 (9th Cir. 1972) (arrest records).
25. The case was dismissed pursuant to FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted).
26. See note 2 supra.
27. See note 69 infra.
28. Supreme Court decisions authorizing the implementation of quotas to achieve school
desegregation illustrate this point. See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ.,
402 U.S. 1 (1971). While courts generally look askance at ratios structured on racial considera-




discriminatory employment practices prior to Title VII's enact-
ment. The court might have felt that whites could not challenge
unvalidated tests because affirmative action should not be dis-
turbed; if so, the court failed to clearly articulate that proposition.
In defining the classes protected by the Act and deciding that whites
are not included, the broad lanugage of the court conveys that under
no circumstances does Title VII protect white persons. Hence, the
potential scope of the decision is troublesome.
The Mele court's concept of "minority" was an underlying factor
in the outcome of the case. According to the court, Congress enacted
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 from concern over the obstacles which
faced members of minority groups seeking equal employment,29 and
did not intend that Title VII should interdict all discrimination
based on race, color, religion, sex and national origin. Rather, the
proscription applied only when blacks or any other "traditional"
minorities were targets of discrimination. 0 In effect the court froze
the definition of "minority," confining it to the context of social
problems existing in 1964 when the Act was passed. Under that
construction, however, the statute has less relevance in the present.
In 1964, "race discrimination" commonly meant discrimination
against blacks, Hispanics and Chicanos; today any group, including
the white majority, may be adversely affected by discrimination.
"Minority" cannot realistically be defined in quantitative terms,
since under that interpretation white anglo-saxon protestants, who
constitute a numerical minority, would be entitled to Title VII pro-
tection while women, who comprise a numerical majority group,
would be excluded.3 1
A literal reading of Title VII, free from the societal overtones of a
given time period, indicates the statute was designed to prohibit any
29. The high minority unemployment rate was a primary reason for the Act's passage;
this was reflected in both the House and Senate committee reports. H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th
Cong., 1st Sess. 26-27 (1963); S. REP. No. 867, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 6-8 (1964). For a copy of
the cited unemployment statistics and part of the congressional debates concerning them see
Blumrosen, The Duty of Fair Recruitment under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 22 RuT. L. REV.
465, 511-27 (1968). See also Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971), where the
Court stated the objective of Congress in enacting Title VII was to achieve equality of employ-
ment opportunities and remove barriers that had operated in the past to favor white employ-
ees over minority employees.
30. 395 F. Supp. at 597.
31. Flaherty & Sheard, DeFunis, The Equal Protection Dilemma: Affirmative Action and
Quotas, 12 DuQ. L. REV. 745, 763 (1974).
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form of discrimination." The legislative history33 also supports the
idea that "minority" is a fluid concept which defines a dominated
group or a group whose interests have been made subservient to
those of another. When the Supreme Court referred to the congres-
sional intent of Title VII in Griggs, it too interpreted Title VII as
limited by the principle of colorblindness. 3 In restricting the cover-
age of Title VII, the Mele court focused on a principle motivation
for Title VII's enactment rather than the actual language of the end
product. 3
This narrow construction of the Act seems strained when con-
trasted with the expansion of comparable federal legislation prohib-
iting employment discrimination. Title VII and § 1981 of the Civil
Rights Act of 186636 are similar in motivation and effect. The latter
32. The relevant language appears at note 7 supra. Proponents of the "plain meaning"
approach to statutory interpretation may argue that Mele's construction of Title VII went so
far as to usurp the power of the legislature. See Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470,
485 (1917) ("[w]here the language is plain and admits of no more than one meaning the duty
of interpretation does not arise .... "). See also Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Read-
ing of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 527 (1947), where the author contends that questions of
statutory construction arise only if there is a fair contest between two possible meanings of
statutory language.
33. There is much dialogue which contradicts the Mele court's contention that Congress
did not intend to protect whites when it enacted Title VII:
The truth is that this title [Title VII] forbids discrimination against anyone on
account of race.
• . .Title VII prohibits discrimination. In effect, it says that race, religion, and
national origin are not to be used as the basis for hiring and firing.
110 CONG. REC. 6549 (1964) (remarks of Senator Humphrey). The floor managers of the bill
stated:
There is no requirement in Title VII that an employer maintain a racial balance in
his work force. On the contrary, any deliberate attempt to maintain a racial balance
• . .would involve a violation of Title VII because maintaining such a balance would
require an employer to hire or refuse to hire on the basis of race.
Id. at 7213 (interpretative memorandum of Title VII submitted by Senators Clark & Case).
Senator Williams remarked: "[T]o hire a Negro solely because he is a Negro is racial
discrimination . . . prohibited by Title VII of this bill." Id. at 8921. See Developments, supra
note 1, at 1114, 1116.
34. "Discriminatory preference for any group, minority or majority, is precisely and only
what Congress has proscribed." Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) (emphasis
added).
35. Cf. Ely, The Constitutionality of Reverse Racial Discrimination, 41 U. Cm. L. REV.
723, 728 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Ely], where the author points out that the equal protec-
tion clause of the fourteenth amendment has been construed to protect other minorities
despite the fact that it was initially intended to protect blacks.
36. Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-82 (1970) reads in pertinent part: "All
persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every State
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statute was overlooked as a weapon against private racial discrimi-
nation until it was revived by the Supreme Court in Jones v. Alfred
H. Mayer Co.." Since then, every circuit which has considered the
question has applied § 1981 to employment discrimination."8 Al-
though the Supreme Court has never ruled on the specific issue,39 a
number of federal courts have held that § 1981 prohibits all discrim-
ination based upon race, against whites as well as blacks. 0 The
rationale of those decisions is apposite to Title VII: when enacting
§ 1981 to protect blacks in the exercise of their new freedoms, the
Congress of 1866 used the rights traditionally enjoyed by whites as
a measure of the treatment to which all citizens were entitled.4 The
courts have refused to limit § 1981's proscription solely to blacks
• ..to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and
property as is enjoyed by white citizens .... " Id. § 1981.
37. 392 U.S. 409 (1968) (§1982 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 prohibits private racial
discrimination in the sale or rental of real property). Jones dealt with § 1982 because a
property interest was involved, but courts have not hesitated to hold that § 1981 also prohibits
private racial discrimination. See note 38 infra.
38. See, e.g., Long v. Ford Motor Co., 496 F.2d 500 (6th Cir. 1974); Macklin v. Spector
Freight Systems, Inc., 478 F.2d 979 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Young v. ITT, 438 F.2d 757 (3d Cir.
1971). Many cases have been brought under both Title VII and § 1981. See, e.g., Boston
Chapter, NAACP, Inc. v. Beecher, 504 F.2d 1017 (1st Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 911
(1975); Ripp v. Dobb Houses, Inc., 366 F. Supp. 205 (N.D. Ala. 1973). There is disagreement
on the procedural differences between the two statutes. Compare Hill v. American Airlines,
Inc., 479 F.2d 1057 (5th Cir. 1973) (plaintiff may sue directly under § 1981 without first
pursuing remedies he may have under Title VII) with Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works, 427
F.2d 476 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 911 (1970) (plaintiff intending to sue under § 1981
must first exhaust his Title VII remedies).
39. In McDonald v. Sante Fe Trail Transp. Co., 513 F.2d 90 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. granted,
44 U.S.L.W. 3257 (U.S. Nov. 3, 1975) (No. 75-260), the lower court dismissed plaintiff's §
1981 claim, reasoning that section conferred no actionable rights upon white persons. The
Supreme Court's decision in McDonald may also affect the scope of Title VII and the extent
to which whites can use it to free themselves from employment discrimination. In addition
to denuding whites of the protection of § 1981, the Fifth Circuit stated that an employer's
dismissal of white, but not black, employees charged with misappropriating funds did not
raise a claim upon which relief could be granted under Title VII. The court did not dismiss
the former employees' complaint on the grounds that the charges of theft were true, but rather
because its position on Title VII was the same as the Mele approach. 513 F.2d at 90-91.
40. E.g., Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315, 327 (8th Cir. 1972) (§ 1981 proscribes all
discrimination whether it be against blacks or whites); Hollander v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,
392 F. Supp. 90 (D. Conn. 1975) (minority recruitment program which excluded whites was
unlawful); WRMA Broadcasting v. Hawthorne, 365 F. Supp. 577, 581 (M.D. Ala. 1973) ("in
those rare instances when a white alleges discrimination under Section 1981, it is entirely
consonant with the purpose of Section 1981 that whites discriminated against for racial
reasons should have standing under Section 1981. ... ); Gannon v. Action, 303 F. Supp.
1240, 1244 (E.D. Mo. 1969) (§ 1981 applies to discrimination against anyone regardless of
race).
41. Hollander v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 392 F. Supp. 90, 94 (D. Conn. 1975).
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who have been victims of discrimination, because members of the
white race who have been denied the rights which were normally
available to them have needed the same protection.42 This reasoning
has also been persuasive to courts in a Title VII setting;43 had the
Mele court considered the similarity between Title VII and § 1981,
it might have reached a different result.
The court did not frame the issue whether a white plaintiff may
invoke Title VII as a question of standing. Standing generally fo-
cuses on the individual bringing suit rather than on the class to
which that person belongs, and the threshold question is whether
this particular plaintiff has suffered an injury.4 In cases challenging
unvalidated tests, however, courts first ask whether the test has
adversely affected members of a particular class. 5 This may explain
why the court approached discrimination in terms of the injury
sustained by Mele's class rather than the injury he may have suf-
fered as an individual. The court concluded that unless a plaintiff
was a member of the classes protected by Title VII, there was no
discrimination and hence no cause of action under the statute." The
conclusion assumed a white complainant was not within the class
protected by the statute without reaching the crucial inquiry of
what groups composed the class. While the Mele court did not ques-
tion the composition of the protected class, other courts which have
dealt with legislation prohibiting discrimination have evolved mod-
ern concepts of standing which undermine the holding in Mele.47
Under Title VII, a "person claiming to be aggrieved" may file a
charge with the EEOC.48 A number of federal courts have inter-
42. Id.
43. See, e.g., United States v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 334 F. Supp. 976, 979
(S.D. Tex. 1971) ("Civil Rights Act of 1964 was passed . . . to help Whites as much as
Negroes, if their civil rights are being violated .... ").
44. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972) (party seeking review must have
himself suffered an injury).
45. See note 21 supra.
46. 395 F. Supp. at 596.
47. Much civil rights legislation has turned on whether the plaintiff seeking relief has
standing to present his claim. See, e.g., Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S.
205 (1972) (white tenants have standing under the Fair Housing Act); Foust v. Transamerica
Corp., 391 F. Supp. 3"12 (N.D. Cal. 1975) (standing under Title VII restricted to those who
are the objects of the prohibited discrimination); Gray v. Greyhound Lines-East, 10 FEP
Cases 259 (D.D.C. 1975) (white plaintiff lacked standing when discrimination against blacks
caused him indirect emotional harm); Elk Grove Firefighters Local 2340 v. Willis, 391 F.
Supp. 487 (N.D. I1. 1975) (one has no standing to sue for the deprivation of another's civil
rights).
48. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(a) (1970).
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preted that language as evincing a congressional intent to define
standing as broadly as the Constitution will permit.49 In Flast v.
Cohen,5 the Supreme Court considered standing under article III of
the Constitution and emphasized that the party seeking to invoke
federal court jurisdiction must have a personal stake in the contro-
versy in order to present a justiciable claim. 5' In Data Processing
Service v. Camp, 2 the Supreme Court looked beyond article III and
enunciated a two-prong test for determining standing conferred by
statute. Under Data Processing, a "person aggrieved" within the
meaning of the Administrative Procedure Act must meet two re-
quirements: he must have suffered injury in fact and the interest he
seeks to have protected must be "within the zone of interests to be
protected or regulated by the statute . . . in question. ' ' 13 Data
Processing expressly acknowledged a trend to enlarge rather than
limit the category of "aggrieved persons."54 The Court followed that
course in Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.," which
gave a white plaintiff standing to challenge racial discrimination in
housing under Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968.'
The standing analysis focuses the issue in Mele on the questions
of whether the plaintiff had sustained injury and whether his inter-
est in freedom from discrimination in hiring was within the "zone
of interests" protected or regulated by Title VII. If Title VII is con-
49. See, e.g., Hackett v. McGuire Bros., 445 F.2d 442, 446 (3d Cir. 1971) (the language
"a person claiming to be aggrieved" evinces an intent to define standing as broadly as article
III of the Constitution permits); Air Line Pilots v. Continental Air Lines, 10 FEP Cases 462
(N.D. Il. 1974) ("i]n using the language 'a person claiming to be aggrieved' Congress
intended to extend standing as far as constitutionally permissible").
50. 392 U.S. 83 (1968) (taxpayers have standing to challenge the validity of federal spend-
ing programs which may violate the establishment clause).
51. Id. at 99, 101. Justice Brennan read Flast to hold that standing exists if the plaintiff
alleges that the challenged action has caused him "injury in fact, economic or otherwise."
Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 172 n.5, 173 n.6 (1970) (concurring in the result and
dissenting).
52. 397 U.S. 150 (1970). Justice Brennan's opinion in Barlow also applied to the result in
Data Processing. Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 167 (1970).
53. 397 U.S. at 153. See Foust v. Transamerica Corp., 391 F. Supp. 312 (N.D. Cal. 1975)
(Title VII plaintiff must have suffered injury and be within the zone of interests the Act seeks
to protect).
54. 397 U.S. at 154.
55. 409 U.S. 205 (1972). One commentator has suggested that the Court was influenced
in Trafficante by the long line of civil rights cases which have expanded the white plaintiffs
ability to bring suit. Comment, Standing to Challenge Housing Discrimination: The Limits
of Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life, 7 URaAN L. ANN. 311 (1974). A sampling of those cases
appears id. at 316 nn.34-41.
56. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-31 (1970).
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strued to prohibit all discrimination, Mele is arguably within the
zone. Nevertheless, the district court apparently felt Mele had not
been injured in fact, since it considered validation a device for pro-
tection of the rights of minority job applicants. According to the
"business necessity" test announced in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,57
however, validation is more accurately characterized as "job-
relatedness." When an applicant has been denied employment on
the basis of his score on a qualifying examination which does not
indicate how well he would have performed the job, he has been
injured no matter what his race. Like the classes in Title VII, the
concept of job-relatedness should be colorblind.
To date, only one other federal court has aligned itself with the
Mele position on Title VII. In Haber v. Klassen,55 the court also
avoided evolving standing doctrine which seemingly has enlarged
the class of persons with justiciable claims of unlawful discrimina-
tory practices. Because it construed Title VII to afford whites no
protection from employment discrimination, the Haber court sum-
marily dismissed the complaint because it saw "no substantial issue
of significant fact."59
As of this writing, Mele and Haber are the only cases which stand
for the proposition that Title VII was never intended to protect
whites from discriminatory hiring practices.'" Other courts which
have dealt with the issue of whether Title VII permits color-
conscious remedies have not been in agreement, but none has gone
so far as to completely denude whites of the Act's protections. There
57. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). See note 10 supra.
58. 10 FEP Cases 1446 (N.D. Ohio 1975).
59. Id. In support of its decision, the Haber court cited McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (plaintiff in a Title VII suit must be afforded fair opportunity to
demonstrate that employer's reason for refusing to rehire him was pretext or discriminatory
in its application). In McDonnell, however, the Supreme Court was unconcerned with the
issue of whom Title VII protects, but rather dealt with the burden of proof required in Title
VII cases. Justice Powell enunciated a four-step formula by which a complainant can meet
his initial burden under the Act to establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination. The
first step establishes that one is a member of a racial minority. Id. at 802. Earlier in his
opinion, however, Justice Powell explicitly stated that Title VII tolerates no discrimination
in any form. Id. at 801. The case did not involve a white plaintiff and at least one federal
court has held, by necessary implication, that the McDonnell formulation does not preclude
whites from bringing suit under Title VII. Parks v. Brennan, 389 F. Supp. 790, 794 (N.D. Ga.
1974). See note 64 infra.
60. There is a fundamental distinction between denying a plaintiff the protection of the
Act and permitting reverse discrimination under the Act due to a compelling state interest.




is some authority for the view that Title VII prohibits all discrimina-
tion, benign or not.6 ' Other courts have refused to sanction preferen-
tial quotas absent findings of discriminatory hiring policies 2 or non-
validated tests. 3 These positions necessarily presume that white
plaintiffs are within the protected "zone."" The Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission itself has ruled that Title VII extends
standing to any person aggrieved by unlawful discriminatory prac-
tices 5 and has explicitly held that the Act protects whites denied
employment opportunities due to preferential hiring.66 Mele is diffi-
cult to reconcile with this most recent pronouncement of EEOC
policy. Even courts which have countenanced preferential quotas 7
have stated in dicta that Title VII affords relief only when there has
been some showing of discrimination. 8 Although the constitutional
61. E.g., Pennsylvania v. Glickman, 370 F. Supp. 724, 736 (W.D. Pa. 1974) ("Title VII
[section 703(j)] of the Civil Rights Act clearly prohibits all hiring on the basis of race");
Decision 75-268, 10 FEP Cases 1502 (EEOC 1975) (an employer may not violate § 703(j) of
Title VII, which proscribes all preferential hiring whether blacks or whites are the favored
class). See Judge Hays' vigorous dissent in Rios v. Steamfitters Local 638, 501 F.2d 622, 639
(2d Cir. 1974), where he argued that many cases which have employed preferential quotas
have ignored § 703(j) and should not be followed. See also Developments, supra note 1, at
1114, where it is suggested the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is limited by the principle of color-
blindness.
62. E.g., Hiatt v. City of Berkeley, 10 FEP Cases 251 (Cal. Super. 1975) (absent discrimi-
nation, city-wide affirmative action plan violated the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
63. See, e.g., Kirkland v. New York State Dep't of Correctional Servs., 520 F.2d 420 (2d
Cir. 1975) (once a court-approved job-related test had been prepared, giving preference to
minorities on racial grounds by the imposition of quotas violated the United States and New
York Constitutions); Bridgeport Guardians, Inc. v. Bridgeport Civil Serv. Comm'n, 482 F.2d
1333, 1341 (2d Cir. 1973), aff'd on rehearing, 497 F.2d 1113 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421
U.S. 991 (1975) (imposition of quota unwarranted absent a finding of a discriminatory exami-
nation for promotion applicants).
64. In Parks v. Dunlop, 517 F.2d 785 (5th Cir. 1975), revg sub nom. Parks v. Brennan,
389 F. Supp. 790 (N.D. Ga. 1974), a Title VII action instituted by a white federal employee,
the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's order granting the appellee a preliminary injunc-
tion. This was not done because the complaint failed to state a claim under Title VII, but
because appellee's remedy at law would be adequate should he prevail on the merits. This
holding implicitly contravenes the Mele position, since the court gave no indication that the
plaintiff's rights under the Act were affected by his color.
65. Decision 74-76, 10 FEP Cases 809, 810 (EEOC 1974) ("Title VII gives standing to any
person aggrieved by any practice forbidden by Title VII") (emphasis added).
66. Decision 75-268, 10 FEP Cases 1502 (EEOC 1975) (an employer may not violate §
703(j) of Title VII, which proscribes all preferential hiring whether whites or blacks are the
favored class).
67. See note 13 supra.
68. For example, in Rios v. Steamfitters Local 638, 501 F.2d 622, 630-31 (2d Cir. 1974),
the court construed Title VII to prohibit preferential treatment as a means of altering racial
imbalances in an employer's work force which were attributable to causes other than invidi-
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issue is beyond the scope of this note, reverse discrimination has
been justified in terms of a compelling state interest to achieve
parity among the races in the employment area."9
The rationale in Mele may further complicate the difficulties en-
countered by courts in grappling with the language of Title VII and
the conflicting interests it attempts to serve.70 In its disposition of
the "novel" issue7 of whether a white plaintiff may invoke the
EEOC guidelines, the Mele court might have meant that employers
may eschew validation requirements when implementing preferen-
tial quotas, under the theory that white applicants must tolerate the
adverse consequences of numerical preferences until minorities
achieve some degree of parity. Such an approach would better ac-
ous discrimination. In the court's view, the Act did not preclude the use of quotas to eradicate
the vestiges of past discriminatory practices. The section of Title VII which necessitated this
construction reads in part:
Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be interpreted to require any employer
• . . to grant preferential treatment to any individual or to any group because of the
race, color, religion, sex or national origin of such individual or group on account of
an imbalance which may exist with respect to the total number or percentage of
persons of any race . . . in comparison with the total number of [sic] percentage of
persons of such race . . . in the available work force in any community, State, section
or other area.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (1970). See Blumrosen, Quotas, Common Sense, and Law in Labor
Relations: Three Dimensions of Equal Opportunity, 27 RUT. L. REV. 675, 690-92 (1974).
69. Compare Associated Gen. Contractors v. Altshuler, 490 F.2d 9, 17-18 (1st Cir. 1973)
(construction contractors challenging minority percentage goals) with Pennsylvania v. Glick-
man, 370 F. Supp. 724, 736 (W.D. Pa. 1974) ("if any racial classification is constitutionally
objectionable in and of itself, then no governmental purpose . . . can justify the imposition
of racially oriented hiring quotas") (footnotes omitted). See also Note, Employment Discrimi-
nation: Statistics and Preferences Under Title VII, 59 VA. L. REV. 463, 491 (1973).
Possibly, a compelling state interest could authorize reverse discrimination. See Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) (equal protection at least requires that government action
predicated on color must be necessary to the attainment of an overriding governmental
purpose); Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954) (racial classifications are constitution-
ally suspect and must be scrutinized with particular care). Perhaps reverse, "ameliorative"
discrimination does not raise serious constitutional questions; the argument has been posed
that racial classifications are not "suspect" in the constitutional sense when a majority
discriminates against itself. Ely, supra note 35, at 726-27. See Comment, Reverse
Discrimination, 45 Miss. L.J. 467, 478-79 (1974) ("compensatory" preferences are not invidi-
ous and hence not constitutionally suspect). But see DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 333
(1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (consideration of race, even for so-called benign purposes, is
capricious and invidious discrimination subject to the closest scrutiny).
70. Title VII requires that employers achieve racial equality in employment while
simultaneously adhering to the principle of color-blindness in hiring. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j)
(1970). It has been recommended that the Act be amended to permit numerical preferences,
thereby alleviating this inherent contradiction. Developments, supra note 1, at 1299-1304.
71. 395 F. Supp. at 595.
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commodate the competing interests at stake; it would uphold af-
firmative action while preserving Title VII as a flexible statute ap-
plicable to groups other than the traditional minorities.
The court seems to have gone much further, however, in its hold-
ing that a white plaintiff has no cause of action under Title VII for
harm done by an unvalidated test. It is one thing to say that Title
VII permits numerical preferences or unvalidated tests, however
reluctantly,72 in order to achieve the racial balance in employment
which was a major purpose of the Act. It is quite another to main-
tain that Title VII was never intended to protect white persons and
therefore is of no avail to nonminorities facing employment discrim-
ination for racial reasons. While courts have disagreed on the degree
of protection Title VII affords, the fact that white complainants are
protected has rarely been denied.73 Were a black-dominated urban
labor union to refuse membership to nonminority individuals solely
on the basis of their race, such a practice would appear discrimina-
tory. Yet the holding in Mele could be used as authority to turn
away complainants on the grounds that the Act is not sufficiently
broad to prohibit such a practice. 4
Aside from its pronouncements on test validation and affirmative
action, the Mele court, perhaps needlessly, addressed one central
consideration: does Title VII prohibit employment discrimination
based on the five general classifications of race, color, religion, sex
and national origin as its language indicates, or only when "tradi-
tional" minorities are denied equal employment opportunities? If
indeed it chose the latter alternative, the court may have deprived
most of the population of the protection of major federal legislation
in the sensitive area of employment opportunity. That decision
would be contrary to EEOC policy75 and would go beyond decisions
72. See Note, Employment Discrimination: Statistics and Preferences Under Title VII,
59 VA. L. REV. 463, 491 (1973).
73. See notes 61-66 supra. Many courts have denied preferential relief under Title VII
absent a showing of purposeful discrimination. See notes 62-63 supra. Although Title VII was
not involved, this was precisely the dilemma left unsolved by the Court in DeFunis v. Ode-
gaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974); there was no finding that the law school had ever intentionally
discriminated against blacks. See Lavinsky, DeFunis v. Odegaard: The "Non-Decision" with
a Message, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 520 (1975).
74. In Haber v. Klassen, 10 FEP Cases 1446, 1447 (N.D. Ohio 1975), the court stated Title
VII was of no avail to a white victimized by employment discrimination, although there were
other statutes which might provide relief to whites similarly situated. The court did not name
the statutes to which it referred.
75. See note 66 supra.
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which have required at least a showing of past discrimination before
approving numerical preferences. Because it ignored standing from
an individual's viewpoint, the decision appears to be outside the
mainstream of recent civil rights cases which have afforded white
plaintiffs access to the courts in order to vindicate their civil rights.7"
A decision at odds with this authority should be based on strong
precedent or cogent reasoning. The Mele decision is susceptible of
this meaning and deficient in both respects.*
Joseph P. Caracappa
PARENT AND CHILD-CUSTODY OF CHILD-VOLUNTARY RELINQUISH-
MENT-PLACEMENT AGREEMENTS-The Supreme Court of Pennsyl-
vania has held that child placement agreements voluntarily exe-
cuted by parents and the county child welfare agency which condi-
tion the child's return on the agency's approval are authorized by
state statutes and the regulations of the Department of Public Wel-
fare and do not violate the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment to the United States Constitution.
Lee v. Child Care Service Delaware County Institution District,
337 A.2d 586 (Pa. 1975).
On August 28, 1972, Rita and Edwin Lee executed a placement
agreement which transferred custody of their son to the Child Care
Service of the Delaware County Institution District.' By the terms
of the agreement, Child Care would arrange for placement, medical
care and appropriate visitation. The child would be returned under
conditions approved by Child Care. In case of'dispute between the
parties, the Juvenile Court of Delaware County would be available
to review the matter and issue necessary orders.' Approximately
76. See notes 40 & 55 supra.
* The Mele decision was appealed on June 3, 1975, and the case is pending before the
Third Circuit Court of Appeals.
1. Hereinafter referred to as Child Care.
2. The agreement form provided spaces for the date, the names of the family members
involved and the reason for the transfer, which was subject to the following conditions:
I, WE agree that said child/children may be removed from [our home] and hereby
grant and give custody of said child/children to said Child Care Service.
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